Fondamentales (Analyses et Réflexions) | Conjoncture | sujet : ARGUMENTS DES BEARS

Citation de : HENRYK3 (au 16-08-2008 16:26:05)

la France a accumulé une dette comme tous les pays occidentaux. Mettre la responsabilité de cette dette sur le dos de tel ou tel parti politique ou homme politique est une stupidité.

La question est de savoir comment juguler les déficits, sans appauvrir le pays et ses citoyens. Je ne crois pas que le monde politique ait de vraies réponses à ce genre de question.

Pour diminuer la dette il faut imposer davantage les particuliers et les entreprises avec un gros risque de délocalisation.

Ou sabrer dans les dépenses publiques ce qui suppose un service public de mauvaise qualité et un accroissement du chomage et de la pauvreté.

Ou augmenter la croissance. Mais personne ne sait comment s'y prendre.

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oui ok , mais la dette Belge ou Irlandaise parti de très haut est bien en baisse - pour le reste de l'Europe je ne sais pas. LA France reste au dessus du seuil critique de la moyenne Européenne .
d'autre part je suis absolument contre des plans type Attali.
Concernant le train de vie de l'Etat , combien représente t il dans la dette publique ? - Bref le diminuer n'est pas mal non plus ! Mais tout ces chiffres sont manipulables .

@+

Dr Doom (l'homme qui quantifie 3 T$ les subprimes) sur le NYtimes
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/17/magazine/17pessi...

En conclusion Roubini dit "«Notre plus gros bailleurs de fonds sont la Chine, la Russie et les États du Golfe," a noté Roubini. «Ce sont des rivaux, pas des alliés.""vous dépendez sur la gentillesse des étrangers»"Ce pourrait être le début de la fin de l'empire américain"
«Je suis mal à l'aise de dire que nous allons aboutir àla Grande Dépression"




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On Sept. 7, 2006, Nouriel Roubini, an economics professor at New York University, stood before an audience of economists at the International Monetary Fund and announced that a crisis was brewing. In the coming months and years, he warned, the United States was likely to face a once-in-a-lifetime housing bust, an oil shock, sharply declining consumer confidence and, ultimately, a deep recession. He laid out a bleak sequence of events: homeowners defaulting on mortgages, trillions of dollars of mortgage-backed securities unraveling worldwide and the global financial system shuddering to a halt. These developments, he went on, could cripple or destroy hedge funds, investment banks and other major financial institutions like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
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Bruce Gilden

The audience seemed skeptical, even dismissive. As Roubini stepped down from the lectern after his talk, the moderator of the event quipped, “I think perhaps we will need a stiff drink after that.” People laughed — and not without reason. At the time, unemployment and inflation remained low, and the economy, while weak, was still growing, despite rising oil prices and a softening housing market. And then there was the espouser of doom himself: Roubini was known to be a perpetual pessimist, what economists call a “permabear.” When the economist Anirvan Banerji delivered his response to Roubini’s talk, he noted that Roubini’s predictions did not make use of mathematical models and dismissed his hunches as those of a career naysayer.

But Roubini was soon vindicated. In the year that followed, subprime lenders began entering bankruptcy, hedge funds began going under and the stock market plunged. There was declining employment, a deteriorating dollar, ever-increasing evidence of a huge housing bust and a growing air of panic in financial markets as the credit crisis deepened. By late summer, the Federal Reserve was rushing to the rescue, making the first of many unorthodox interventions in the economy, including cutting the lending rate by 50 basis points and buying up tens of billions of dollars in mortgage-backed securities. When Roubini returned to the I.M.F. last September, he delivered a second talk, predicting a growing crisis of solvency that would infect every sector of the financial system. This time, no one laughed. “He sounded like a madman in 2006,” recalls the I.M.F. economist Prakash Loungani, who invited Roubini on both occasions. “He was a prophet when he returned in 2007.”

Over the past year, whenever optimists have declared the worst of the economic crisis behind us, Roubini has countered with steadfast pessimism. In February, when the conventional wisdom held that the venerable investment firms of Wall Street would weather the crisis, Roubini warned that one or more of them would go “belly up” — and six weeks later, Bear Stearns collapsed. Following the Fed’s further extraordinary actions in the spring — including making lines of credit available to selected investment banks and brokerage houses — many economists made note of the ensuing economic rally and proclaimed the credit crisis over and a recession averted. Roubini, who dismissed the rally as nothing more than a “delusional complacency” encouraged by a “bunch of self-serving spinmasters,” stuck to his script of “nightmare” events: waves of corporate bankrupticies, collapses in markets like commercial real estate and municipal bonds and, most alarming, the possible bankruptcy of a large regional or national bank that would trigger a panic by depositors. Not all of these developments have come to pass (and perhaps never will), but the demise last month of the California bank IndyMac — one of the largest such failures in U.S. history — drew only more attention to Roubini’s seeming prescience.

As a result, Roubini, a respected but formerly obscure academic, has become a major figure in the public debate about the economy: the seer who saw it coming. He has been summoned to speak before Congress, the Council on Foreign Relations and the World Economic Forum at Davos. He is now a sought-after adviser, spending much of his time shuttling between meetings with central bank governors and finance ministers in Europe and Asia. Though he continues to issue colorful doomsday prophecies of a decidedly nonmainstream sort — especially on his popular and polemical blog, where he offers visions of “equity market slaughter” and the “Coming Systemic Bust of the U.S. Banking System” — the mainstream economic establishment appears to be moving closer, however fitfully, to his way of seeing things. “I have in the last few months become more pessimistic than the consensus,” the former Treasury secretary Lawrence Summers told me earlier this year. “Certainly, Nouriel’s writings have been a contributor to that.”

On a cold and dreary day last winter, I met Roubini over lunch in the TriBeCa neighborhood of New York City. “I’m not a pessimist by nature,” he insisted. “I’m not someone who sees things in a bleak way.” Just looking at him, I found the assertion hard to credit. With a dour manner and an aura of gloom about him, Roubini gives the impression of being permanently pained, as if the burden of what he knows is almost too much for him to bear. He rarely smiles, and when he does, his face, topped by an unruly mop of brown hair, contorts into something more closely resembling a grimace.

When I pressed him on his claim that he wasn’t pessimistic, he paused for a moment and then relented a little. “I have more concerns about potential risks and vulnerabilities than most people,” he said, with glum understatement. But these concerns, he argued, make him more of a realist than a pessimist and put him in the role of the cleareyed outsider — unsettling complacency and puncturing pieties.

Roubini, who is 50, has been an outsider his entire life. He was born in Istanbul, the child of Iranian Jews, and his family moved to Tehran when he was 2, then to Tel Aviv and finally to Italy, where he grew up and attended college. He moved to the United States to pursue his doctorate in international economics at Harvard. Along the way he became fluent in Farsi, Hebrew, Italian and English. His accent, an inimitable polyglot growl, radiates a weariness that comes with being what he calls a “global nomad.”

As a graduate student at Harvard, Roubini was an unusual talent, according to his adviser, the Columbia economist Jeffrey Sachs. He was as comfortable in the world of arcane mathematics as he was studying political and economic institutions. “It’s a mix of skills that rarely comes packaged in one person,” Sachs told me. After completing his Ph.D. in 1988, Roubini joined the economics department at Yale, where he first met and began sharing ideas with Robert Shiller, the economist now known for his prescient warnings about the 1990s tech bubble.

The ’90s were an eventful time for an international economist like Roubini. Throughout the decade, one emerging economy after another was beset by crisis, beginning with Mexico’s in 1994. Panics swept Asia, including Thailand, Indonesia and Korea, in 1997 and 1998. The economies of Brazil and Russia imploded in 1998. Argentina’s followed in 2000. Roubini began studying these countries and soon identified what he saw as their common weaknesses. On the eve of the crises that befell them, he noticed, most had huge current-account deficits (meaning, basically, that they spent far more than they made), and they typically financed these deficits by borrowing from abroad in ways that exposed them to the national equivalent of bank runs. Most of these countries also had poorly regulated banking systems plagued by excessive borrowing and reckless lending. Corporate governance was often weak, with cronyism in abundance.

Roubini’s work was distinguished not only by his conclusions but also by his approach. By making extensive use of transnational comparisons and historical analogies, he was employing a subjective, nontechnical framework, the sort embraced by popular economists like the Times Op-Ed columnist Paul Krugman and Joseph Stiglitz in order to reach a nonacademic audience. Roubini takes pains to note that he remains a rigorous scholarly economist — “When I weigh evidence,” he told me, “I’m drawing on 20 years of accumulated experience using models” — but his approach is not the contemporary scholarly ideal in which an economist builds a model in order to constrain his subjective impressions and abide by a discrete set of data. As Shiller told me, “Nouriel has a different way of seeing things than most economists: he gets into everything.”

Roubini likens his style to that of a policy maker like Alan Greenspan, the former Fed chairman who was said (perhaps apocryphally) to pore over vast quantities of technical economic data while sitting in the bathtub, looking to sniff out where the economy was headed. Roubini also cites, as a more ideologically congenial example, the sweeping, cosmopolitan approach of the legendary economist John Maynard Keynes, whom Roubini, with only slight exaggeration, calls “the most brilliant economist who never wrote down an equation.” The book that Roubini ultimately wrote (with the economist Brad Setser) on the emerging market crises, “Bailouts or Bail-Ins?” contains not a single equation in its 400-plus pages.

After analyzing the markets that collapsed in the ’90s, Roubini set out to determine which country’s economy would be the next to succumb to the same pressures. His surprising answer: the United States’. “The United States,” Roubini remembers thinking, “looked like the biggest emerging market of all.” Of course, the United States wasn’t an emerging market; it was (and still is) the largest economy in the world. But Roubini was unnerved by what he saw in the U.S. economy, in particular its 2004 current-account deficit of $600 billion. He began writing extensively about the dangers of that deficit and then branched out, researching the various effects of the credit boom — including the biggest housing bubble in the nation’s history — that began after the Federal Reserve cut rates to close to zero in 2003. Roubini became convinced that the housing bubble was going to pop.

By late 2004 he had started to write about a “nightmare hard landing scenario for the United States.” He predicted that foreign investors would stop financing the fiscal and current-account deficit and abandon the dollar, wreaking havoc on the economy. He said that these problems, which he called the “twin financial train wrecks,” might manifest themselves in 2005 or, at the latest, 2006. “You have been warned here first,” he wrote ominously on his blog. But by the end of 2006, the train wrecks hadn’t occurred.

Recessions are signal events in any modern economy. And yet remarkably, the profession of economics is quite bad at predicting them. A recent study looked at “consensus forecasts” (the predictions of large groups of economists) that were made in advance of 60 different national recessions that hit around the world in the ’90s: in 97 percent of the cases, the study found, the economists failed to predict the coming contraction a year in advance. On those rare occasions when economists did successfully predict recessions, they significantly underestimated the severity of the downturns. Worse, many of the economists failed to anticipate recessions that occurred as soon as two months later.

The dismal science, it seems, is an optimistic profession. Many economists, Roubini among them, argue that some of the optimism is built into the very machinery, the mathematics, of modern economic theory. Econometric models typically rely on the assumption that the near future is likely to be similar to the recent past, and thus it is rare that the models anticipate breaks in the economy. And if the models can’t foresee a relatively minor break like a recession, they have even more trouble modeling and predicting a major rupture like a full-blown financial crisis. Only a handful of 20th-century economists have even bothered to study financial panics. (The most notable example is probably the late economist Hyman Minksy, of whom Roubini is an avid reader.) “These are things most economists barely understand,” Roubini told me. “We’re in uncharted territory where standard economic theory isn’t helpful.”



True though this may be, Roubini’s critics do not agree that his approach is any more accurate. Anirvan Banerji, the economist who challenged Roubini’s first I.M.F. talk, points out that Roubini has been peddling pessimism for years; Banerji contends that Roubini’s apparent foresight is nothing more than an unhappy coincidence of events. “Even a stopped clock is right twice a day,” he told me. “The justification for his bearish call has evolved over the years,” Banerji went on, ticking off the different reasons that Roubini has used to justify his predictions of recessions and crises: rising trade deficits, exploding current-account deficits, Hurricane Katrina, soaring oil prices. All of Roubini’s predictions, Banerji observed, have been based on analogies with past experience. “This forecasting by analogy is a tempting thing to do,” he said. “But you have to pick the right analogy. The danger of this more subjective approach is that instead of letting the objective facts shape your views, you will choose the facts that confirm your existing views.”

Kenneth Rogoff, an economist at Harvard who has known Roubini for decades, told me that he sees great value in Roubini’s willingness to entertain possible situations that are far outside the consensus view of most economists. “If you’re sitting around at the European Central Bank,” he said, “and you’re asking what’s the worst thing that could happen, the first thing people will say is, ‘Let’s see what Nouriel says.’ ” But Rogoff cautioned against equating that skill with forecasting. Roubini, in other words, might be the kind of economist you want to consult about the possibility of the collapse of the municipal-bond market, but he is not necessarily the kind you ask to predict, say, the rise in global demand for paper clips.

His defenders contend that Roubini is not unduly pessimistic. Jeffrey Sachs, his former adviser, told me that “if the underlying conditions call for optimism, Nouriel would be optimistic.” And to be sure, Roubini is capable of being optimistic — or at least of steering clear of absolute worst-case prognostications. He agrees, for example, with the conventional economic wisdom that oil will drop below $100 a barrel in the coming months as global demand weakens. “I’m not comfortable saying that we’re going to end up in the Great Depression,” he told me. “I’m a reasonable person.”

What economic developments does Roubini see on the horizon? And what does he think we should do about them? The first step, he told me in a recent conversation, is to acknowledge the extent of the problem. “We are in a recession, and denying it is nonsense,” he said. When Jim Nussle, the White House budget director, announced last month that the nation had “avoided a recession,” Roubini was incredulous. For months, he has been predicting that the United States will suffer through an 18-month recession that will eventually rank as the “worst since the Great Depression.” Though he is confident that the economy will enter a technical recovery toward the end of next year, he says that job losses, corporate bankruptcies and other drags on growth will continue to take a toll for years.

Roubini has counseled various policy makers, including Federal Reserve governors and senior Treasury Department officials, to mount an aggressive response to the crisis. He applauded when the Federal Reserve cut interest rates to 2 percent from 5.25 percent beginning last summer. He also supported the Fed’s willingness to engineer a takeover of Bear Stearns. Roubini argues that the Fed’s actions averted catastrophe, though he says he believes that future bailouts should focus on mortgage owners, not investors. Accordingly, he sees the choice facing the United States as stark but simple: either the government backs up a trillion-plus dollars’ worth of high-risk mortgages (in exchange for the lenders’ agreement to reduce monthly mortgage payments), or the banks and other institutions holding those mortgages — or the complex securities derived from them — go under. “You either nationalize the banks or you nationalize the mortgages,” he said. “Otherwise, they’re all toast.”

For months Roubini has been arguing that the true cost of the housing crisis will not be a mere $300 billion — the amount allowed for by the housing legislation sponsored by Representative Barney Frank and Senator Christopher Dodd — but something between a trillion and a trillion and a half dollars. But most important, in Roubini’s opinion, is to realize that the problem is deeper than the housing crisis. “Reckless people have deluded themselves that this was a subprime crisis,” he told me. “But we have problems with credit-card debt, student-loan debt, auto loans, commercial real estate loans, home-equity loans, corporate debt and loans that financed leveraged buyouts.” All of these forms of debt, he argues, suffer from some or all of the same traits that first surfaced in the housing market: shoddy underwriting, securitization, negligence on the part of the credit-rating agencies and lax government oversight. “We have a subprime financial system,” he said, “not a subprime mortgage market.”

Roubini argues that most of the losses from this bad debt have yet to be written off, and the toll from bad commercial real estate loans alone may help send hundreds of local banks into the arms of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. “A good third of the regional banks won’t make it,” he predicted. In turn, these bailouts will add hundreds of billions of dollars to an already gargantuan federal debt, and someone, somewhere, is going to have to finance that debt, along with all the other debt accumulated by consumers and corporations. “Our biggest financiers are China, Russia and the gulf states,” Roubini noted. “These are rivals, not allies.”

The United States, Roubini went on, will likely muddle through the crisis but will emerge from it a different nation, with a different place in the world. “Once you run current-account deficits, you depend on the kindness of strangers,” he said, pausing to let out a resigned sigh. “This might be the beginning of the end of the American empire.”

Denmark's house prices fall

As the first bubble economy to hit the skids and officially fall into recession, tiny Denmark deserves a mention. Statistics Denmark has released figures showing that house prices are falling in Denmark, which joins an ever-increasing group of countries that includes the UK, the US, Spain and Ireland.

Citation de : ybm (au 16-08-2008 15:04:35)

Citation de : rationnel (au 16-08-2008 13:11:28)

Citation de : ybm (au 16-08-2008 12:25:23)

Citation de : rationnel (au 16-08-2008 12:05:24)

Sarkozy par ci, Sarkozy par là

lisez ceci pour une autre vision du rôle de la France dans le conflit russo-géorgien :

moins glamour, certes

http://hebdo.nouvelobs.com/hebdo/parution/p2284/do...

dont j'extrais ceci, pour ceux qui ont fait confiance à Nicolas

"Mais Saakachvili croyait aussi dur comme fer au soutien de Nicolas Sarkozy. Le président français ne l'avait-il pas rencontré plusieurs fois discrètement, avant et après son élection ? N'avait-il pas aussi, fin décembre et à la demande d'André Glucksmann, reçu longuement à l'Elysée le principal lobbyiste américain de la candidature de la Géorgie (et de l'Ukraine) à l'Otan, l'énigmatique Bruce Jackson ? Alors, évidemment, Sarkozy allait dire oui et convaincre la très réticente Angela Merkel de faire comme lui. C'est du moins ce que Saakachvili pensait.
Seulement voilà : il est advenu l'inverse. Au cours du dîner des chefs d'Etat, le mercredi 2 avril, Nicolas Sarkozy et Angela Merkel ont, de conserve, opposé leur veto à la candidature de la Géorgie. Avant de rejoindre l'Otan, ont-ils expliqué, Tbilissi doit d'abord régler ses conflits «gelés» avec l'Ossétie du Sud et l'Abkhazie."

la trahison comme seconde nature

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Rationnel,

Quel rapport avec le sujet de la file " ARGUMENTS DES BEARS".....??

Eclaire ma lanterne,merci;

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Bear en France par ce qu'il n'y a pas de pilote dans l'avion. Bear dans le monde parceque la Géorgie est une première étape pour ceux qui ont compris la fragilité de l'Occident avec des leaders pareils...

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On sent poindre un brin de nostalgie...........

SI tu pouvais nous ....." RESCUCITER .......TONTON "..!!!

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Tonton, non, De Gaulle, Churchill, oui

on va arreter la remontée dans le temps SVP..sinon on va finir avec gengis Khan et Alexandre le grand

Si ça intéresse, un sans de secteurs US pas mal:

http://www.istockanalyst.com/

A droite;

Lire Scan

Citation de : serge.harimax (au 16-08-2008 17:42:53)

Si ça intéresse, un sans de secteurs US pas mal:

http://www.istockanalyst.com/

A droite;

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pas compris ce que tu voulais signaler..ca ouvre une page de posts entre autre..un en particulier ??

Scan des Secteurs US:

Sector Scan

Today 7 Days 30 Days 60 Days 90 Days


Construction 1.02 %


Retail/Wholesale 0.82 %


Multi-Sector Conglomerate 0.49 %


Auto/Tires/Trucks 0.40 %


Business Services 0.40 %


Consumer Staples 0.30 %


Medical 0.23 %


Finance 0.17 %


Consumer Discretionary 0.16 %


Utilities 0.11 %


Aerospace 0.09 %


Computer and Technology -0.02 %


Transportation -0.13 %


Industrial Products -0.65 %


Oils/Energy -1.43 %


Basic Materials -2.02 %



Auto/Tires/Trucks 7.76 %


Retail/Wholesale 5.98 %


Consumer Discretionary 5.16 %


Construction 4.96 %


Aerospace 4.72 %


Business Services 4.48 %


Transportation 4.36 %


Multi-Sector Conglomerate 4.28 %


Consumer Staples 4.18 %


Industrial Products 4.06 %


Medical 3.87 %


Computer and Technology 3.79 %


Finance 3.02 %


Utilities 1.48 %


Oils/Energy -0.37 %


Basic Materials -1.21 %



Retail/Wholesale 17.56 %


Construction 16.95 %


Auto/Tires/Trucks 15.55 %


Consumer Discretionary 15.33 %


Finance 14.49 %


Aerospace 13.87 %


Transportation 13.75 %


Multi-Sector Conglomerate 12.76 %


Business Services 11.55 %


Industrial Products 9.42 %


Consumer Staples 9.23 %


Computer and Technology 9.11 %


Medical 9.09 %


Utilities 1.77 %


Basic Materials -3.71 %


Oils/Energy -9.59 %



Retail/Wholesale 4.45 %


Medical 2.88 %


Construction 2.53 %


Transportation 2.11 %


Aerospace 1.92 %


Multi-Sector Conglomerate 1.11 %


Business Services 0.60 %


Industrial Products -0.42 %


Finance -1.75 %


Consumer Discretionary -1.90 %


Consumer Staples -2.09 %


Computer and Technology -2.91 %


Utilities -3.96 %


Auto/Tires/Trucks -5.58 %


Basic Materials -12.00 %


Oils/Energy -17.68 %



Medical 2.26 %


Retail/Wholesale 0.83 %


Business Services -1.13 %


Industrial Products -2.21 %


Multi-Sector Conglomerate -3.55 %


Utilities -4.17 %


Computer and Technology -4.79 %


Construction -4.91 %


Consumer Staples -6.57 %


Finance -7.79 %


Consumer Discretionary -7.95 %


Transportation -8.52 %


Aerospace -9.30 %


Oils/Energy -13.57 %


Basic Materials -14.24 %


Auto/Tires/Trucks -16.43 %

L'article, toujours d'actualité date de 03/08:

Federal Reserve: Household Equity at all time lows

The Fed just released the Balance Sheet of Households for 2007 Q4.

It shows home owners equity as a percentage of household real estate at 47.9%, the lowest on record. Going back 20+ years, this number was as high as 68.2% in 1986.

In other words, for the first time ever, banks/lender own more of the houses in America than the folks who live there do.

And, that's at current household prices. If the recent downward price acceleration gets any worse, we are going to see an even lower number. Moody's Economy.com estimates that 8.8 million homeowners -- about 10.3% percent of all U.S. homes -- will have zero or negative equity by the end of this month. Another 10-15 million households are at risk of becoming "upside down" if prices continue falling.

Here's what Jim Walker of Asianomics had to say last month:

"Essentially, US house prices - on average - are down 10% on the year. The "on average" proviso is important. In New York and the Bay Area house prices are either up or flat. In some parts of the US - southern California, Nevada, Florida - the drop in house prices is in the region of 30-50%. This puts a lot of American's in negative equity.

RJ McCreary of Kelusa Capital sent me a few charts on US home values assuming a 90% loan-to-value ratio. In one, he estimated where we were in negative equity terms on different scenarios of falling home prices using November data. The chart shows the date at which the average home owner is under water given the fall in house prices so far - and then another 5, 10, and 15% drop. Anyone who has bought a house since late 2005 is now in negative equity (remember, this is assuming a conservative 10% deposit on the purchase).

That's ugly. Here's the referenced chart:

http://www.asianom.com/newsletter/public/images/US...

Now for the real rub -- the reality is actually worse than the chart above.

Why?

Mortgage Equity Withdrawal (MEW) by existing home owners. You have seen our numbers in the past on MEW -- an ungodly amount of equity was converted into GDP -- cash withdrawals were spent on cars, renovations, vacations. This was all at the expense of Equity.

Now, we see via the Fed that not only was this an artificial prop to GDP, there was a real cost to it -- Household Equity is below 50%. This is unprecedented in American economic history.

We do indeed live in interesting times . . .




As we noted back in March via, the Federal Reserve released data showing that, thanks to HELOCs and MEW, Household Equity was at all time lows. As the chart below shows, we crossed the 50% household equity level For the first time since World War II. In the 1980s, that figure was 70%.

http://bigpicture.typepad.com/comments/files/equit...

http://bigpicture.typepad.com/comments/2008/08/hom...

Bonjour Saylor

En suivant cette file il me semble qu'il reste à trouver une façon de diriger l'économie d'un pays.

1- faire confiance au marché et aux financiers qui sont censés réguler le marché en interdisant le plus possible les interventions de l'Etat dans un domaine qui n'est pas les sien. Les entrepreneurs sont assez grands pour réguler eux-mêmes le marché car c'est leur métier.

2 - faire confiance au marché et aux financiers mais trouver un organisme qui les surveille et mette en place des règles de fonctionnement,comme par exemple faire payer par ceux qui ont touchés les billions de bénéfices de mauvaises actions bancaires leurs pertes et non par les contribuables qui n'y sont pour rien. Car il semble tout de même que l'appât du gain a fait perdre la tête à nos financiers, traders, actionnaires, banquiers, etc... surtout qu'ils savaient qu'ils ne risquaient rien l'Etat , c'est à dire les contribuables paieraient leurs erreurs.

Toi qui à l'air d'avoir des idées sur la politique quel système crois-tu qu'il faudrait inventer pour permettre aux entrepreneurs de créer sans aboutir au désastre actuel ?

Pour Chris , je vois que tu as un correspondant aux US avec Roubini

¤ Réduire la CRDS et la CSG pour permettre d'entreprendre plus.

¤ Harmoniser l'Europe au plus vite - harmoniser les salaires des hauts fonctionnaires au plus tôt. A défaut de ne pouvoir faire marche arrière .

¤ Pour stimuler la croissance PIB diminuer l'épargne et la M3.

la VO du week end
http://www.youtube.com/v/fzuinISI9Bk&hl=en&fs=1

Mon titre du soir
http://www.deezer.com/track/193544

Bonsoir Saylor

Tu sembles avoir plus de facilités à critiquer qu'à créer

(voir post en 670)

De mémoire,le seul moyen de diminuer l épargne c est de créer de l inflation en laissant les taux très bas....ce qui incite les gens à tout dépenser,ayant peur que les prix montent demain .....

Généralement,ca a mené au désastre, de mémoire (mais à confirmer).....les cigales européennes sont les allemands...ils ne dépensent rien,comme les hollandais d ailleurs....les francais épargnent mais ils ont aussi beaucoup de dettes...

Baisser les impots ne sert à rien si ca ne sert pas un but précis,chiffré...c est souvent un effet d aubaine....

A titre personnel,quand je vois le plan de Bling Bling sur la baisse de la TVA pour la restauration,je suis étonné que l Etat ne signe pas un accord cadre pour la création (promise par la fédération) de 500.000 postes.....si cette clause n est pas remplie,alors retour à l ancien systeme de taxe....

De mémoire,il y a aussi des regles comptables à revoir et des affectations à revoir...des ministeres dépensent des lignes de budget car si ils ne le font pas,elle n est pas reconduite l année suivante....ca me parait suicidaire....

Et changer la perspective fiscale à MT me parait essentiel au retour de la confiance ...et arrêter l exil des élites....ce qui me parait urgent..voir tous les entrepreneurs francais déménager à Bruxelles,les HEC ESSEC à Londres ou NY..ou tout simplement les joueurs de foot (formés sur fonds publics et partant désormais à 16 ans)....ca me parait une aberration incroyable.....depuis quand un pays "intelligent" laisse il partir ses élites ??

cel a dit,on ne refera pas la France..donc concentrons nous sur le reste ...un commentaire de ci de là est toujours welcome..de préférence un peu humoristique....(style Gattaca marx brothers)

issu de Barrons

IT MAY BE CURTAINS SOON FOR THE MANAGEMENTS and shareholders of beleaguered housing giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac . It is growing increasingly likely that the Treasury will recapitalize Fannie and Freddie in the months ahead on the taxpayer's dime, availing itself of powers granted it under the new housing bill signed into law last month. Such a move almost certainly would wipe out existing holders of the agencies' common stock, with preferred shareholders and even holders of the two entities' $19 billion of subordinated debt also suffering losses. Barron's first raised the possibility of a government takeover of Fannie and Freddie in a March 10 cover story, "Is Fannie Mae Toast?"

Many of Fannie's and Freddie's credit losses come from risky mortgages that the agencies bought or guaranteed in recent years to boost their market share.


Similarly, the balance sheets of both companies have been destroyed. On a fair-value basis, in which the value of assets and liabilities is marked to immediate-liquidation value, Freddie would have had a negative net worth of $5.6 billion as of June 30, while Fannie's equity eroded to $12.5 billion from a fair value of $36 billion at the end of last year. That $12.5 billion isn't much of a cushion for a $2.8 trillion book of owned or guaranteed mortgage assets.


Bonne chance pour lever de l argent

all but $300 million of the $7.2 billion in equity Fannie raised in the second quarter was lost in the very same quarter, according to its fair-value balance sheet. With credit losses surging at both agencies, $20 billion in new common equity wouldn't last long.

peut etre des "preferred stocks " ....non plus...

The cost of selling new preferred stock, meanwhile, would seem to be prohibitive for Fannie and Freddie. The dividend yields on their preferreds have soared to around 14%, in part because of a recent rating downgrade by Standard & Poor's. Yields that high would blight the future earnings prospects of both concerns.